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INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY AND THE MANAGERIAL
EMPLOYEE EXCEPTION TO THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS ACT
ALBERT

G. BIXLERt

When Congress passed the National Labor Relations Act in 1935
(the Act),' it created a powerful device to regulate the relationship between labor and management. The congressional intent to foster peaceful settlements of disputes between workers and their employers2 was
based upon the establishment of industrial democracy:3 the relationship
between workers and their employers was to be a microcosm of the
larger representative democracy of American society.4
Industrial democracy comprehends two distinct elements. First, it
describes the idealized relationship between individuals and their bargaining representatives and those representatives and management. 5
This is democracy in the structural sense, a process by which employees deal with their union representatives and those representatives in
turn work out agreements with employers. Second, it includes the concept that can also be called workplace democracy: the ability of employees through their representatives to shape the form and content of their
employment. 6 In this sense, industrial democracy entails worker participation in the decisions that mold their employment. In its most idealized form, workplace democracy means that employees cooperate with
t B.A. 1977, University of Pennsylvania; M.A. 1981, University of California at
Santa Barbara; J.D. 1984, University of Pennsylvania. The author wrote this Comment while a student at the University of Pennsylvania Law School.
' National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, ch. 372, 49 Stat.
449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982)).
2 See NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 257 (1939); NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45 (1937).
1 One of the general objectives of the Act was "to encourage, by developing the
procedure of collective bargaining, that equality of bargaining power which is a prerequisite to equality of opportunity and freedom of contract." S. REP. No. 573, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1935). See also infra text accompanying notes 108-14.
' See Stone, The Post-War Paradigm in American Labor Law, 90 YALE L.J.
1509, 1514-15 (1981).
1 See J. WrrE, DEMOCRACY, AUTHORITY, AND ALIENATION IN WORK 3 (1980)

("Industrial democracy implies . . . a set of decision-making mechanisms based on a
reasonable assumption of political equality.").
6 See infra notes 115-22 and accompanying text.
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management in running the company. 7 Since the Act's passage in 1935,
interpretations of the Act by both the courts and the National Labor
Relations Board have seriously eroded the foundation of both of these
aspects of industrial democracy.8
A recent decision by the Board, College of Osteopathic Medicine
and Surgery,' emerging from the judicially created managerial employee exception of the Act's coverage,"0 threatens further to vitiate the
concept of industrial democracy. The Board, following the logic of recent Supreme Court decisions," held in effect that once employees have
attained the real ability to influence the policies of their employer
through the process of collective bargaining, they can no longer be considered employees under the Act. Once employees have attained the
democratic goals of the Act, they lose the Act's protections. Although
the Board's decision concerned a faculty in an institution of higher education, it is not logically limited to such contexts. 2 Its implications for
the ideal of industrial democracy are thus profound.
This Comment considers the recent expansion of the managerial
employee exception, the framework from which it developed, and its
implications. Part I outlines the growth of the managerial employee
exclusion, in both the industrial and higher education contexts, and examines College of Osteopathic Medicine against this background. Part
II explores the impact of the managerial employee exclusion and the
College of Osteopathic Medicine doctrine both on faculty collective bargaining and on industrial democracy in general, and asserts the incompatibility of that doctrine with the goal of industrial democracy. Part
III suggests a resolution of this conflict.
' See Sartori, Democracy, in 4 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES

114 (1968) ("In its ultimate form, industrial democracy calls for self-govern-

ment by the workers in a plant . . ").
' See Klare, Judicial Deradicalizationof the Wagner Act and the Origins of
Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265, 292-93, 318-25
(1978).

" 265 N.L.R.B. 295 (1982), discussed infra text accompanying notes 81-107.
'o See infra text accompanying notes 14-39; see also Asher, Determination of
"Employee" Status: A Recurring Problem in Representation Cases, 34 PROC. N.Y.U.
NAT'L. CONF. LAB.

171, 173-184 (1981).

" See NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672 (1980); NLRB v. Bell Aerospace
Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974), overruled on other grounds, NLRB v. Hendricks County
Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 454 U.S. 170, 186-88 (1981).
12 See infra text accompanying notes 152-55.
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I.

THE MANAGERIAL EMPLOYEE EXCLUSION

A. Background of the Exception
Managerial employees are defined as those who "formulate and
effectuate management policies by expressing and making operative the
decisions of their employer." 13 Although the Act does not specifically
exclude managerial employees from its protection, 4 both the National
Labor Relations Board and the courts have long felt the exclusion of
such employees to be appropriate. 5 Before the 1947 Taft-Hartley
amendments to the Act, the Board's treatment of managerial employees
was inconsistent and confused. 16 In these early decisions, the Board consistently blurred the distinction, later to become quite important, be-,
tween managerial and supervisory employees, often using the two terms
interchangeably.1
As the Supreme Court later recognized, supervisors are employees
such as foremen who "use independent judgment in overseeing other
employees in the interest of the employer."1 8 Unlike managerial employees, they are not "involved in developing and enforcing employer
policy." 1 9 After vacillating on the issue whether supervisory employees
were included within the Act's coverage, 20 the Board in 1945 decided
Palace Laundry Dry Cleaning Corp., 75 N.L.R.B. 320, 323 n.4 (1947).
See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1982).
See, e.g., NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672 (1980); NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974), overruled on other grounds, NLRB v. Hendricks
County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 454 U.S. 170, 186-88 (1981); Palace Laundry
Dry Cleaning Corp., 75 N.L.R.B. 320 (1947).
16 See Bell Aerospace Co. v. NLRB, 475 F.2d 485, 488-93 (2d Cir. 1973), affd
in part & rev'd in part, 416 U.S. 267 (1974), overruled on other grounds, NLRB v.
Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 454 U.S. 170, 186-88 (1981); H.R.
REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 13-14 (1947); S.REP. No. 105, 80th Cong. 1st
Sess., 3-5 (1947). Compare Maryland Drydock Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 733, 738 (1943)
("[W]e are no longer convinced that from the mere determination that a supervisor is
an employee it follows that supervisors may constitute appropriate bargaining units.")
with Packard Motor Car Co., 61 N.L.R.B. 4, 26 (1945) (recognizing unit of foremen).
17 See, e.g., Chicago Rotoprint Co., 45 N.L.R.B. 1263, 1266 (1942) (general foreman excluded from bargaining unit because he possessed "managerial authority"); Julien P. Friez & Sons, 47 N.L.R.B. 43, 47 (1943) (excluding expediters from bargaining
units because they are "closely related to the management"); Country Life Press Corp.,
51 N.L.R.B. 1362, 1364 (1943) ("Although it has been the Board's policy to recognize
collective bargaining rights which have been traditionally exercised by foremen in the
printing trades, it has, nevertheless, excluded such general foremen as appear to possess
managerial authority.") (footnotes omitted); Lord Baltimore Press, Inc., 73 N.L.R.B.
811, 815 (1947) ("Foremen and supervisory employees in the printing industry are
customarily included in rank and file units unless their supervisory authority is so extensive that they may be considered as managerial employees.") (footnote omitted).
a1NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 682 (1980) (footnote omitted).
"' Id. (footnote omitted).
20 See supra note 16.
',
15
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that they were: in PackardMotor Car Co.,21 the Board held that foremen could constitute an appropriate bargaining unit.
The Supreme Court narrowly approved the Board's position in
Packard,2 but its decision was short-lived. The Court was "overruled"
when Congress amended the Act specifically to exclude supervisors
from the definition of covered employees.23 In thus denying supervisory
employees the protection of the Act, Congress was motivated by a desire
to insure that rank and file employee bargaining units remain free from
domination by supervisors,24 as well as by the conviction that employers
were entitled to the undivided loyalty of their agents and that such loyalty was threatened by the unionization of supervisors.25
Although the 1947 amendments referred specifically only to supervisors, 26 the Board continued to recognize that a category of managerial
employee was also excluded from the coverage of the Act.27 Because
these employees were even more closely aligned to management than
were supervisors, the Board reasoned that exclusion of supervisors necessarily compelled exclusion of managerial employees. Congress must
have regarded this class of employees as "so clearly outside the Act that
no specific exclusionary provision was thought necessary." 28
In 1972, however, the Board attempted to limit the application of
its managerial employee concept to those employees associated with the
61 N.L.R.B. 4, 26 (1945), affd, 330 U.S. 485 (1947).
Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 490-91 (1947) (5-4 decision).
23 See Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, ch.
120, § 101, 61 Stat. 136, 137-38 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 152 (1982)). The
Packard decision figured prominently in Congress's decision to exclude supervisors. See
H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 13-14 (1947); S.REP. No. 105, 80th Cong.,
1st Sess. 3-5 (1947).
24 H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1947).
21

22

25
26

Id. at 16.
See supra note 23.

27 See, e.g., Swift & Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 752, 753-54 (1956) (holding that procurement drivers were not employees under the Act because they were "allied with management"); American Locomotive Co., 92 N.L.R.B. 115, 117 (1950) (excluding buyers
from bargaining unit because they were "representatives of management"). See also
Palace Laundry Dry Cleaning Corp., 75 N.L.R.B. 320, 323 n.4 (1947):
The determination of "managerial," like the determination of "supervisory," is to some extent necessarily a matter of the degree of authority
exercised. We have in the past, and before the passage of the recent
amendments to the Act, recognized and defined as "managerial" employees, executives who formulate and effectuate management policies by expressing and making operative the decisions of their employer, and have
excluded such managerial employees from bargaining units. . . . We believe that the Act, as amended, contemplates the continuance of this
practice.
28 NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 283 (1974), overruled on other
grounds, NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 454 U.S. 170,
186-88 (1981).
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"formulation and implementation of labor relations policies." 2 9 This

shift in the treatment of managerial employees met with strong disapproval from both the courts of appeals 0 and the Supreme Court.31
Again by a narrow majority, the Court held that the Board's previous
interpretation of the managerial exception, as well as the purpose and
history of the Taft-Hartley amendments, prevented it from reading a
"new and more restrictive meaning into the Act."'3 2 The Court thereby
ratified a broad definition of managerial employees.
This expansive definition of managerial employees 3 presented severe problems when applied to professional employees" who, because
their particular skills, often perform tasks bordering on the managerial.
To compound the problem, professionals were specifically included in
the definition of "employee" by the 1947 amendments. 5 Could professionals ever lose the protection of the Act because of the managerial
nature of their roles?
The Board confronted this problem in General Dynamics Corp. 6
Although it did not deny that some professional employees may exercise
managerial authority, the Board noted that "managerial authority is
not vested in professional employees merely by virtue of their profes29 Bell Aerospace Co., 196 N.L.R.B. 827, 828 (1972). See Brief for the National
Labor Relations Board at 23, NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
s0 See Bell Aerospace Co. v. NLRB, 475 F.2d 485, 494-95 (2d Cir. 1973).
3 See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 289 (1974) (5-4 decision),
overruled on other grounds, NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership
Corp., 454 U.S. 170, 186-87 (1981).
32 Id. at 289. But see id. at 304-05 (White, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with majority's readings of Board practice and legislative history); Angel, Professionals and
Unionization, 66 MINN. L. REV.383, 434-39 (1982); Barney, Bell Aerospace and the
Status of ManagerialEmployees Under the NLRA, 1 INDUS. REL. L.J. 346, 348-63
(1976).
3' The Board has consistently used the definition formulated in Palace Laundry
Dry Cleaning Corp., 75 N.L.R.B. 320, 323 n.4 (1947). See supra text accompanying
notes 13 & 27.
3,Professional employees are defined in 29 U.S.C. § 152(12)(a) (1982) as:
any employee engaged in work (i) predominantly intellectual and varied
incharacter as opposed to routine mental, manual, mechanical, or physical
work; (ii) involving the consistent exercise of discretion and judgment in
its performance; (iii) of such a character that the output produced or the
result accomplished cannot be standardized in relation to a given period of
time; (iv) requiring knowledge of an advanced type in a field of science or
learning customarily acquired by a prolonged course of specialized intellectual instruction and study in an institution of higher learning or a hospital, as distinguished from a general academic education or from an apprenticeship or from training in the performance of routine mental,
manual, or physical processes . . ..
See generally Angel, supra note 32, at 383.
11 See Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, ch.
120, 61 Stat. 136, 138-39 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 152(12) (1982)).
38 213 N.L.R.B. 851 (1974).
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sional status, or because work performed in that status may have a
bearing on company direction.""7 The Board instead decided to include
within the scope of the Act professional employees who have "discretion in their job performance independent of their Employer's established policy.""8 In contrast, managerial employees have job functions
"aligned with managerial authority rather than with work performance
of a routine, technical, or consultative nature.""9
The Board's assessment of the role of professionals in General Dynamics left an opening for another attempt to expand the definition of
managerial employee. Faculty members who set policy for their colleges
and universities can be described as "aligned with managerial authority." Not surprisingly, the next major development in this area was the
evaluation of the status of faculty at institutions of higher education.
B.

University and College Faculty and the Managerial Employee
Doctrine
The Board first asserted jurisdiction over the faculty of a private

university in 1970.40 Shortly thereafter, faculty unionization was chal-

lenged on the basis of the managerial employee doctrine. In C.W. Post
Center,4 1 the university challenged the creation of a faculty bargaining
unit, claiming that faculty members exercised sufficient authority to
qualify them as supervisors or managerial employees under the Act.
The Board rejected this challenge.42 It concluded that the faculty had
authority only when it acted collectively and that authority so exercised
was not managerial.4 3 The Board also noted that analysis of the case
37 Id. at 857-58.
8 Id. at 858. See also Sutter Community Hosps., Inc., 227 N.L.R.B. 181, 193
(1976) (defining managerial employee as one who "participates directly in the employer's policymaking process") (emphasis added).
3 General Dynamics Corp., 213 N.L.R.B. at 858.
40 Cornell Univ., 183 N.L.R.B. 329, 334 (1970). This reversed the position taken
by the Board in Trustees of Columbia Univ., 97 N.L.R.B. 424 (1951).
41 189 N.L.R.B. 904 (1971).
42 Id. at 905; accord Adelphi Univ., 195 N.L.R.B. 639, 648 (1972) (collective
authority does not render faculty supervisory); Fordham Univ., 193 N.L.R.B. 134, 135
(1971) (same).
41 C.W. Post Center, 189 N.L.R.B. at 905; see Syracuse Univ., 204 N.L.R.B. 641,
643 (1973) ("[Rleliance on industrial models alone is not appropriate and cannot serve
all the legitimate interests of employees in what, until recently, was terra incognita for
the Act and for this Board."); Adelphi Univ., 195 N.L.R.B. 639, 648 (1972) ("Because
authority vested in one's peers, acting as a group, simply would not conform to the
pattern for which the supervisory exclusion of our Act was designed, a genuine system
of collegiality would tend to confound us."). The Board had, however, examined systems of collective authority before. See Cab Services, Inc., 123 N.L.R.B. 83, 84-85
(1959); Mutual Rough Hat Co., 86 N.L.R.B. 440, 444 (1949); Alderwood Products
Corp., 81 N.L.R.B. 136, 138 (1949); Olympia Shingle Co., 26 N.L.R.B. 1398, 1413-
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was difficult because management at a college or university differed in
structure from that found in the traditional industry context.4 4 Undaunted by this "terra incognita," however, the Board continued to
certify units of faculty, adding new rationales for doing so to its "collective authority" theory.4 5
By finding faculty to be more professional than managerial, the
Board in effect recognized that they exercised "discretion in their job
performance independent of their Employer's established policy." ' At
stake in such a decision was not merely the characterization of certain
employees as included or excluded, but the delimiting of the Act's coverage in a far broader sense. If a narrow definition of "professional" is
chosen, the ability of employees to "professionalize" their work is limited by the broadening managerial employee exclusion towards which
the Board is presently moving. Thus, the inclusion or exclusion of
faculty, although certainly significant, is but one manifestation of a
larger redefinition of "worker" and "management" that has far broader
implications."
In 1980 the issue of faculty status under the Act reached the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Yeshiva University.48 The Board rejected the
university's claim that the potential faculty unit was composed solely of
supervisory or managerial employees by concluding that faculty participation in decisionmaking was collective, that it was exercised in the
faculty's own professional interest rather than in the employer's interest, and that the faculty lacked final authority in decisionmaking.4 9 The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied enforcement of the
Board's order, chastising the Board for undertaking no analysis of the
15 (1940). All these cases concerned the status of stockholder-employees in enterprises
owned largely or totally by the workers.
Syracuse Univ., 204 N.L.R.B. 641, 643 (1973).
4 See, e.g., Fairleigh Dickinson Univ., 227 N.L.R.B. 239, 241 (1976) (final decisionmaking authority is vested in hands other than the faculty); Syracuse Univ., 204
N.L.R.B 641, 643 (1973) (faculty decisions made out of the faculty's own professional
interests rather than interest of administration; issue was whether law faculty should be
included in same unit as other faculty). For other cases in which the Board certified
faculty units, see Salem College, 245 N.L.R.B. 1129 (1979); Drury College, 244
N.L.R.B. 747 (1979); Ithaca College, 244 N.L.R.B. 517 (1979), enforcement denied,
623 F.2d 224 (2nd Cir. 1980); Stephens College, 240 N.L.R.B. 166 (1979).
4' General Dynamics Corp., 213 N.L.R.B. 851, 858 (1974).
47 See infra text accompanying notes 108-23; see also Klare, The Bitter and the
Sweet: Reflections on the Supreme Court's Yeshiva Decision, 13 SOCIALIsT REV.,
Sept.-Oct. 1983, at 99, 111 (Yeshiva decision is based on the assumption that "employee status and self-determination in work are incompatible").
48 444 U.S. 672 (1980).
41 See Yeshiva Univ., 221 N.L.R.B. 1053, 1054 (1975), enforcement denied, 582
F.2d 686 (2nd Cir. 1978), affd, 444 U.S. 672 (1980).
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university's arguments.5" The Supreme Court narrowly affirmed,
find51
ing that the Yeshiva faculty exercised managerial authority.
The Board dropped its "collective authority" and "lack of final
authority" theories before the Supreme Court, relying instead only on
the theory that the faculty members exerted decisionmaking power in
their own professional interest rather than in the interests of their employer. 2 The Court rejected this argument, 5 noting that the faculty at
Yeshiva wielded authority "which in any other context unquestionably
would be managerial."'" The Court concluded that the decisionmaking
structure at Yeshiva was collegial, with the faculty making and implementing management policies.5 In such a context, the Court concluded,
the interests of faculty and administration were indistinguishable: any
attempt to separate them would divide faculty loyalties. 6
In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on several policy
statements in works on faculty participation in academic governance as
evidence that such collegiality did exist.

7

The Court determined that at

"mature" institutions, decisionmaking was based on a system of collegiality or "shared authority.

'5
1

When authority was thus "divided be-

tween a central administration and one or more collegial bodies," 59 the
faculty exercised managerial authority within the Board's previous defi5' NLRB

v. Yeshiva Univ., 582 F.2d 686, 702-03 (2d Cir. 1978), affd, 444 U.S.

672 (1980).
5 Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 691 (1980) (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun,

JJ., dissented).
11 Id. at 685; see Brief for the National Labor Relations Board at 36-40, Yeshiva,
444 U.S. 672.
11 See 444 U.S. at 686-90.
5

Id. at 686.

55 See id. at 680 ("[A]uthority in the typical 'mature' private university is divided
between a central administration and one or more collegial bodies. . . . [T]raditions of
collegiality continue to play a significant role at many universities, including Yeshiva.")
(footnote omitted).
56 See id. at 688-89.
17 The Court cited AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR HIGHER EDUCATION, FACULTY
PARTICIPATION IN ACADEMIC GOVERNANCE 22-24 (1967) and Kadish, The Theory of

the Profession and its Predicament, 58 A.A.U.P.- BULL. 120, 121 (1972). See Yeshiva,
444 U.S. at 689 n.28. The Court also cited an article highly critical of the Board's
ability to regulate faculty administration relations: Kahn, The NLRB and Higher Education: The Failure of Policymaking Through Adjudication, 21 UCLA L. REv. 63
(1973). See Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 680 n.10. There were, however, differing views to be
found. See, e.g., Finkin, The NLRB in Higher Education, 5 U. TOL. L. REv. 608, 615
(1974) ("Mature colleges and universities . . .tend to have a dual-track decisional
system whereby authority in a hierarchical sense is lodged in the administration ...
while a recommendatory authority is lodged in the faculty . . ").
" 444 U.S. at 680. In a system of shared authority, decisionmaking authority is
divided between the administration and the faculty. See J. BALDRIDGE, POWER AND
CONFLICT IN THE UNIVERSITY

59

444 U.S. at 680.

11-15 (1971).
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nitions of that authority. 60 Yeshiva University, the Court concluded,
was such an institution." The majority was therefore careful to limit
the reach of its opinion to those institutions that, like Yeshiva, were

",mature." 2

Justice Brennan, writing for the dissenters, disagreed with the
Court's rejection of the Board's "independent professional interest" argument.6 3 Although he agreed with the majority that faculty members
command considerable power, he concluded that this power is employed in furtherance of faculty members' own professional interest
rather than in pursuit of the administration's interests. On a broader
scale, Brennan concluded that the majority had transferred the managerial exception to a context in which it is inappropriate, and was viewing the real nature of university governance through a "rose-colored
lens."' 64 The faculty at a modern university does not enjoy as much
authority as the Court supposed. Education today is not based on a
collegial decisionmaking system, he concluded, but is rather a "big business" that no longer resembles the medieval model utilized by the majority.6 5 Possession of considerable discretion in running certain limited
aspects of a university's affairs does not render a faculty managerial in
the same sense that certain employees in industrial contexts are

"managerial."

The Yeshiva decision triggered an avalanche of commentary, most
of it highly critical of the position taken by the majority. 6 Undoubt80 444 U.S. at 686. The Court reaffirmed the correctness of the definition of managerial employee developed in PalaceLaundry Dry Cleaning Corp., 75 N.L.R.B. 320
(1947), cited in NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 288 (1974). See Yeshiva,
444 U.S. at 682-83.
6 See 444 U.S. at 690 n.31.
82 See id. at 680, 690. For a definition of "mature," see infra note 157 and text
accompanying notes 98-100.
63 See 444 U.S. at 695-703 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 702 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
85 Id. at 702-03 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
68 See, e.g., Benson, To Bargain or Govern: The Impact of Yeshiva on Private
and Public Sector Collective Bargaining in Higher Education, 7 OHIO N.U.L. REv.
259 (1980); Bethel, Private University Professors and NLRB v. Yeshiva: The Second
Circuit's Misconception of Shared Authority and Supervisory Status, 44 Mo. L. REv.
427 (1979); Gergacz & Krider, NLRB v. Yeshiva University: The End of Faculty
Unions?, 16 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 891 (1980); Lee, Faculty Role in Academic Governance and the ManagerialExclusion: Impact of the Yeshiva University Decision, 7
J.C. & U.L. 222 (1980-81); Zirkel and Pease, Beyond Yeshiva: The Casefor a Coordinated Approach to Faculty Bargaining, 11 STETSON L. Rlv. 51 (1981); Comment,
The Supervisory Status of Private University Faculty Members Under the NLRA:
NLRB v. Yeshiva University, 43 ALB. L. REV. 162 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Supervisory Status]; Comment, NLRB v. Yeshiva University: Faculty as Managerial Employees Under the NLRA, 19 AM. Bus. L.J. 63 (1981); Note, The Supreme
Court, 1979 Term, 94 HARV. L. REv. 77, 251-61 (1980); Note, NLRB v. Yeshiva
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edly, the Yeshiva Court did to a large degree view the modern university through a rose-colored lens. Commentators were quick to point out
that the system of decisionmaking in most modern universities was not
one of collegial authority but rather something quite different.6 7 The
Yeshiva Court thus failed to recognize that the purpose behind the supervisory exception, and by extension that behind the managerial employee exception, is simply not served by excluding faculty members
from the protection of the Act.6"
More serious than the Court's failure correctly to assess the realities of the distribution of authority in universities is the questionable
legal premise on which the Yeshiva decision rests. The paradigm of
collective bargaining that underlies the decision-collective bargaining
as incompatible with, or destructive of, a cooperative system of decisionmaking 6 -is a betrayal of one of the fundamental purpose of the Act:
peaceful labor relations through industrial democracy.70 The goal of industrial democracy is defeated by denying the protection of the labor

laws to workers at the most nearly democratic institutions. Moreover,
the Yeshiva decision is not limited to the academic context. The Court
recognized that the Board's "independent professional judgment" test

University: The Professional-ManagerialOverlap, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 659 (1981);
Note, N.L.R.B. v. Yeshiva University: The Demise of Academic Collective Bargaining?, 32 MERCER L. REV. 907 (1981); see also infra note 67 (collecting sources).
"7 See Finkin, Regulation by Agreement: The Case of PrivateHigher Education,
65 IOWA L. REV. 1119, 1159 (1980); Suntrup, NLRB v. Yeshiva University and
Unionization in Higher Education, 4 INDUS. REL. L.J. 287, 298-99 (1981); Sussman,
University Governance Through a Rose-Colored Lens: NLRB v. Yeshiva, 1980 Sup.
CT. REV. 27, 43-48; Note, Collective Authority and Technical Expertise: Reexamining
the Managerial Employee Exclusion, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 694, 709 & n.103 (1981).
The fact that modern universities do not fit the medieval model of collegiality has been
pointed out by at least one member of the Board:
As I view the decision-making structure at most major colleges and universities . . . faculty members do not formulate or effectuate administra-

tion policies, nor are the senior faculty members so closely aligned with
the administration that their inclusion in a unit with junior faculty members would give rise to a conflict of interest.
Northeastern Univ., 218 N.L.R.B. 247, 257 (1975) (Member Kennedy, concurring in
part and dissenting in part). See also Baldridge & Kemerer, Academic Senates and
Faculty Collective Bargaining, 47 J. HIGHER EDUC. 391, 393 (1976) (faculty senates
are "dependent bodies" granted power through the "grace" of the administration).
88 See infra note 164; see also infra text accompanying notes 168-70.
6 In a very real way, reliance on a model of collective bargaining as a strictly
adversarial relationship between labor and management only serves to reinforce that
model. By eliminating employees from the Act's coverage because they are aligned with
management, the Court has emphasized and widened the rift between labor and management while obscuring the real conflict (between labor and capital). See Packard
Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 493-501 (1947) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
70 See infra notes 108-12 and accompanying text.
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could be applied to other areas of employment .7 a Likewise, the Court's
exclusion of workers who share authority with management can extend
to all areas of employment.
Yet, despite the potentially broad sweep of its decision, the Yeshiva
Court attempted to narrow its holding by explicitly limiting its scope to
mature institutions.7 2 The Court did not categorically exclude all university faculty from the Act's protection, but effectively required that
the Board undertake detailed fact-finding in each case to determine if
the faculty in question possesses managerial authority like that exercised by the Yeshiva faculty. 7' The Board was quick to note this fact,'7
7
as were the courts of appeals enforcing Board orders in this area.

5

Of

necessity, the course mandated by Yeshiva has resulted in a patchwork
7
of decisions, some holding that the institution involved is like Yeshiva,
7
others holding to the contrary, based on an ad hoc determination of
7s
the amount of decisionmaking power vested in the faculty in question.
The effects of Yeshiva were felt quickly. Not unexpectedly,
Yeshiva defenses to unionization efforts and unfair labor practices
charges have become important weapons in the arsenal of employer
71

See 444 U.S. at 686-87.

See 444 U.S. at 680, 690 n.31. For a definition of maturity, see infra note 157;
see also infra text accompanying notes 98-100.
71 See 444 U.S. at 690 & n.31, 691.
7" See, e.g., Pratt Inst., 256 N.L.R.B. 1166, 1167 (1981). ("Yeshiva was meant to
apply only to a mature university, where the faculty, acting in a collegial capacity,
governed the school in all its major aspects.").
On April 10, 1981, the NLRB General Counsel issued a memorandum detailing
the treatment to be given to cases involving faculty unionization. The General Counsel
isolated a number of factors to be considered: faculty participation in decisionmaking,
the interests furthered by that participation, and their accountability for the decisions
they make. See 4 LAB. L. REP. (CCH) § 9254 (1981).
7 See, e.g., Berry Schools v. NLRB, 627 F.2d 692, 699 n.6 (5th Cir. 1980)
("[T]he Supreme Court held [in Yeshiva] that in a college truly run on a collegial basis,
all faculty members are managerial employees . . . ."); Stephens Inst. v. NLRB, 620
F.2d 720, 727 (9th Cir.) ("In Yeshiva, the Court applied the managerial employee
exception to a 'mature' university."), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980).
76 See, e.g., Duquesne Univ. of the Holy Ghost, 261 N.L.R.B. 587, 589 (1982);
Thiel College, 261 N.L.R.B. 580, 586 (1982); Ithaca College, 261 N.L.R.B. 577, 578
(1982).
7 See, e.g., Lewis Univ., 265 N.L.R.B. 1239, 1241 (1982); Fundacion Educativa
Ana G. Mendez, 265 N.L.R.B. 72, 75 (1982); Florida Memorial College, 263
N.L.R.B. 1248, 1252-53 (1982); New York Medical College, 263 N.L.R.B. 903, 90607 (1982); Montefiore Hosp. & Medical Center, 261 N.L.R.B. 569, 571-72 (1982);
Bradford College, 261 N.L.R.B. 565, 566 (1982).
7'8 The Board's approach imposes heavy burdens of proof on the parties because of
the individualized nature of the inquiry. This heavy burden may, in fact, have a disproportionate impact on economically weaker parties. See Klare, supra note 47, at 101.
Klare comments on the expense to the employer of bringing a Yeshiva challenge to
unionization. However, the threat of a Yeshiva challenge may lead a union to decertify
voluntarily rather than incur large litigation costs.
72
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universities.7 9 Such defenses have not been limited to "mature university" settings and have in fact spread beyond the context of higher education. 80 The next section discusses an expansion of the Yeshiva rule
that poses an even greater threat than did Yeshiva to the attainment of
industrial democracy.
C.

College of Osteopathic Medicine and Surgery: The Logical
Conclusion

One unanswered question lurking behind the Yeshiva doctrine was
the treatment to be accorded faculty (and other employees) who exercised sufficient authority to be considered managerial within Yeshiva
but did so only because such power had been vested in them by a collective bargaining agreement. The Board first faced this problem in
College of Osteopathic Medicine and Surgery"' [COMS], in which it
found that the amount of authority exercised by the faculty was enough

to qualify them as managerial employees.
The parties in COMS had entered into collective bargaining agreements in 1976 and in 1978.82 In 1981 the college, claiming that its
faculty had attained managerial status, petitioned the NLRB to clarify83 the unit to exclude all employees within it and to revoke the
union's certification." 4 As a defense to this claim, the union asserted
that such decertification was improper because the faculty's authority

had been gained solely through collective bargaining.8 5 After evaluating
the nature of faculty authority in light of Yeshiva,8" the Board con"' As of May 1, 1981, 37 institutions of higher education had exercised Yeshiva
claims. Douglas, The Yeshiva Case: One Year Later, in THE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
STATUS OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN HIGHER EDUCATION 14, 16 (J. Douglas ed.
1981) (table 1) [hereinafter cited as J. DOUGLAS]. These statistics do not include instances where Yeshiva may have exerted a chilling effect on faculty bargaining. In
1981, there were three union decertifications as a result of successful Yeshiva claims. J.
DOUGLAS & S. KRAMER, DIRECTORY OF FACULTY CONTRACTS AND BARGAINING
AGENTS IN INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION 56 (1982); see also Sheppard &

Moran, The Futureof Faculty Collective Bargainingat Private Universities,9 J.C. &
U.L. 41, 49 (1982-83).
80 See, e.g., Walla Walla Union-Bulletin v. NLRB, 631 F.2d 609, 612-13 (9th
Cir. 1980); Florence Volunteer Fire Dep't, Inc., 265 N.L.R.B. 955, 957 (1982); District No. 1, Pac. Coast Dist., Marine Engineers Beneficial Ass'n, 259 N.L.R.B. 1258,
1265-66 (1982).
8' 265 N.L.R.B. 295 (1982).
82

Id. at 295.

See R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAw 50-52 (1976) (explaining the
process of "clarification" of bargaining units).
83

84

265 N.L.R.B at 295.

85
88

Id. at 295-96.
See id. at 296-97.
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cluded that the COMS faculty members were managerial employees."7
The COMS faculty did in fact exercise considerable authority in
the areas of curriculum, academic policies, admissions policies, student
academic standards, hiring of faculty, promotion decisions, and tenure
decisions."8 It exercised this authority, however, through a series of
committees established pursuant to the initial collective bargaining
agreement." 9 The union contended that authority obtained as a result of
collective bargaining was not within the definition of managerial authority comprehended by Yeshiva.90 In rejecting this argument, the
Board relied mechanically on Yeshiva: it saw no explicit grounds in
that decision to support the union's position.91
The COMS decision was not an aberration. Since COMS the
Board has reaffirmed its willingness to disregard the source of faculty
authority in its Yeshiva analysis. In Lewis University, 2 the Board again
confronted this issue and reached a similar conclusion. The faculty at
Lewis was certified as a bargaining unit in 1975 and entered into a
collective bargaining agreement shortly thereafter.9 3 When the agreement expired in 1980, the university and its faculty reached a tentative
agreement. The university repudiated this agreement after the Yeshiva
decision, proposing to replace it with a faculty handbook. 9 ' The university argued that its faculty members were managerial; the emanation of
at least part of their authority from the collective bargaining agreement
was not a material consideration. Although a majority of the Board
disagreed that the faculty was managerial, 95 it seemed willing to accept
the university's argument regarding the immateriality of the source of
the faculty's authorityY6 On this point, the majority and dissent were in
agreement. 7
Although the Board's conclusions in COMS and Lewis are logically related to Yeshiva, they are troubling in several respects. COMS is
inconsistent with Yeshiva in a very important sense. Yeshiva was careSee id. at 297.
88 Id. at 296-97.
9 Id. at 296.
90 Id. at 297.
91 See id. at 297-98.
92 265 N.L.R.B. 1239 (1982).
93 Id. at 1242.
87

94 Id.

95 See id. at 1249-50.

96 See id. at 1242 ("[W]e do not view authority which faculty members exercise
pursuant to the master contract as ipso facto nonmanagerial.").
97 See id. at 1253 (Member Hunter, dissenting) ("[The origins of a faculty's authority are irrelevant to the question of whether that authority establishes the faculty as
managerial.").
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fully limited by its terms to mature institutions.9" Such institutions are
those characterized by a sharing of authority between the administration and one or more collegial bodies.99 These systems of decisionmaking evolve quite differently from systems in which managerial authority
is secured solely through the terms of a collective bargaining agreement.10 0 Because mature institutions distribute decisionmaking power
along lines determined over long periods of time, such systems are
sounder in a structural sense than the decisionmaking systems developed under a collective bargaining agreement. This may be particularly
true where the present distribution of power under a collective bargaining agreement has resulted from conflicting faculty and administration
interpretations of the agreement that were resolved through arbitration.
COMS, of course, treats authority developed through both means
as equivalent. However, the difference in the genesis of the shared authority makes the Yeshiva decision inapplicable to the COMS situation,
even if Yeshiva was decided correctly on its own facts.10 1 The faculty at
a "mature" institution might have decisionmaking power sound enough
to make the protection of the labor laws unnecessary. If the faculty's
decisionmaking power has been gained through the bargaining process,
depriving the faculty of its status as a bargaining unit could undermine
the structure of shared authority.
The COMS doctrine will no doubt also be attractive to administrations that wish to terminate present collective bargaining relationships.1 0 2 At present, there are over 350 collective bargaining agreements
in two- or four-year institutions of higher education,' 0 3 many of which
contain provisions that may be grounds for faculty status reconsideration under COMS.104 Moreover, incorporation of faculty constitutions
into collective agreements or inclusion of the faculty senate within the
agreement' 0 5 may threaten the status of the union. Of course, such conSee supra text following note 57.
99 Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 680.
100 This is not meant to imply that Yeshiva was decided correctly. See infra note
157; see also infra text accompanying notes 160-62.
101 See infra notes 156-59 and accompanying text.
'02 There is a strong argument that such will be the case in light of events following Yeshiva. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
103 J. DOUGLAS & S. KRAMER, supra note 79, at 61 (table 4).
104 In a study of 89 collective bargaining agreements at four-year institutions,
"most" require faculty contributions in consideration of initial appointment, promotion
evaluations, and discharge decisions. R. JOHNSTONE, THE SCOPE OF FACULTY COL9

LECTIVE BARGAINING: AN ANALYSIS OF FACULTY UNION AGREEMENTS AT FOURYEAR INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION 34, 40 (1981).
10I Johnstone reports that out of 89 institutional agreements surveyed, 15 incorporated a faculty constitution of some kind and 19.1% included the academic or faculty
senate within the agreement. R. JOHNSTONE, supra note 104, at 119, 126.
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stitutions are enforceable only as long as they remain a part of the
larger collective bargaining agreement.10 6
In addition to the threat posed to the development of workplace
democracy, COMS also promises unfavorable effects for the collective
bargaining process. On the most practical level, faculties undoubtedly
bargain away something to induce administrations to delegate authority
to them. In effect, the Board's decisions could result in the loss of this
bargain, for once a faculty loses the protection of the labor laws, a college can remove the authority the faculty had gained through collective
bargaining without making concessions in return. In a puzzling bit of
dictum, the Board recognized that the faculty might lose its contractbased authority and suggested that the faculty reorganize at that time:
"If the College removes sufficient authority from its faculty members so
that they revert to the status of nonmanagerial employees, the Board
10 7
will process a proffered representation petition at that time."
The labor laws insure a democratic process of bargaining. To strip
a party of the gains it has made through collective bargaining is to
undermine the process itself. Recertification is hardly the answer if development of workplace democracy will only lead once more to decertification. The following section will explore the ramifications of the
COMS decision on the democratic process of collective bargaining, as
well as on the evolution of workplace democracy.
II.

THE

COMS
A.

DOCTRINE AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

The Ideal of Industrial Democracy

The animating objective behind the National Labor Relations Act
was to insure the peaceful resolution of disputes between labor and
management through the establishment of a system of industrial democracy.108 The concept of industrial democracy, 109 developed well before
106 University administrators may have independent reasons for honoring such
documents, such as the desire not to alienate the faculty. These reasons will, however,
be strongly related to the innate power or prestige of the faculty. In situations where
faculty members are easily replaceable, such as at small nonprestigious institutions,
faculty constitutions may, in fact, carry no weight.

107 265 N.L.R.B. at 298.
108 See Klare, supra note

8, at 281-84; Summers, Industrial Democracy:
America's Unfulfilled Promise, 28 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 29, 34 (1979); see also supra
note 2 and accompanying text.
109 Milton Derber suggests that industrial democracy rests on the following principles: representation, participation, equality of rights and opportunities, right of dissent,
due process, responsibility, standards of minimum employment terms and conditions,
information availability, and personal dignity. M. DERBER, THE AMERICAN IDEA OF
INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY 1865-1965, at 19-20 (1970).
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the 1935 Wagner Act, 10 has consistently been considered a primary
goal of the Act. 11' The Act's sponsor, Senator Wagner, stated during
the congressional debate on the Act that "democracy in industry must
be based upon the same principles as democracy in government."'1 2
The attainment of industrial democracy through collective bargaining is
one of the cornerstones of federal labor law.
One aspect of industrial democracy concerns the ability of employees to unite and, through a collective representative, bargain with their
employers over the terms and conditions of their employment. 1 3 Implicit in the nature of the bargaining system contemplated by the Act is
the idea that the exact content of the bargain eventually reached is to be
left to the parties with little or no outside regulation." 4 The parties
should be able to determine for themselves the economic and
noneconomic aspects of the bargain. Under COMS, the noneconomic
aspects of the parties' bargain are vulnerable. Too much success in
achieving noneconomic goals (for example, decisionmaking authority),
or in attaining workplace democracy, could lead to decertification.
Another aspect of industrial democracy concerns the sharing of
decisionmaking authority between labor and management." 5 In some
workplaces, management has given employees authority in order to in110 See FINAL REPORT OF THE U.S. COMMISSION ON INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, S.
Doc. No. 415, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. (1916); see also C. SUMMERS, H. WELLINGTON
& A. HYDE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW 13-24 (2nd ed. 1982).
111 See Klare, supra note 8, at 284.
79 CONG. REc. 7571 (1935) (remarks of Sen. Wagner). In discussing his proposal, Senator Wagner also stated:
The principles of my proposal were surprisingly simple. They were
founded upon the accepted facts that we must have democracy in industry
as well as in government; that democracy in industry means fair participation by those who work in the decisions vitally affecting their lives and
livelihood; and that the workers in our great mass production industries
can enjoy this participation only if allowed to organize and bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing.
M. DERBER, supra note 109, at 321 (citing N.Y. Times, Apr. 13, 1937, at 20, col. 1).
111 See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976).
114 Certain provisions of collective bargaining agreements may later fail as illegal.
See, e.g., NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322 (1974) (contract language limiting the
right of employees to distribute union literature in the plant did not stand). Nothing
prevents the discussion of such provisions in bargaining sessions.
It is true, however, that the Board and the courts have developed doctrinal shields
that allow certain aspects of the management of a business to be removed from discussion ifmanagement so decides. See, e.g., First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452
U.S. 666 (1981); Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965)
(employer's decision to shut down not a mandatory subject of bargaining).
115 An extreme example is the election of Douglas Fraser to the Board of Directors of the Chrysler Corporation. See generally Note, supra note 67; Comment, An
Economic and Legal Analysis of Union Representationon CorporateBoards of Directors, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 919, 927 (1982).
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crease efficiency or decrease costs. Many firms have received economic
concessions from their unionized employees by giving them increased
voice in the governance of the enterprise."n Many others, in an effort to
increase worker satisfaction and productivity,"' have attempted to inject
additional worker participation in the shaping of their employment.
The value of reshaping management structures in these ways has been
widely chronicled,' and it can be expected that the trend towards in118 There has been increasing recognition of the problems and ramifications of
worker alienation both at the personal and national level. In 1972, a bill was introduced in Congress to provide funding for research into the problem; it never passed. See
S. 3916, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 118 CONG. REC. 27,999 (1972); see also Worker Alienation, 1972: Hearing on S. 3916 Before the Subcomm. on Employment, Manpower,
and Poverty of the Sen. Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1972); Quality of Productionand Improvement in the Workplace: HearingBefore the
Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1980) (examination of various ways of increasing productivity including increasing
amounts of "worker involvement").
117 For a discussion of the benefits of increasing worker participation, see Long,
The Effects of Employee Ownership on OrganizationalIdentification, Employee Job
Attitudes, and OrganizationalPerformance:A Tentative Framework and Empirical
Findings,31 HUMAN REL. 29, 39 (1978) (most employees felt that their job performance improved, and most experienced increases in job satisfaction, after employee ownership began); Zimbalist, The Dynamic of Worker Participation,in ORGANIZATIONAL
DEMOCRACY 49, 56 (G. Garsen & M. Smith eds. 1975) (noting increases in productivity, job satisfaction, and employee investment after expropriation of industries and institution of worker participation). But see E. RHENMAN, INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY
AND INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT 90 (1968) (increases in productivity may be illusory
because the period of measurement may be too short).
118 See, e.g., SELF MANAGEMENT: NEW DIMENSIONS TO DEMOCRACY (I. Adizes
& E. Borgese eds. 1975) (descriptions of industrial democracy experiments from Yugo-

slavia, Israel, and Norway); SELF-MANAGEMENT AND WORKERS' PARTICIPATION (K.

Sethi, A. Sengupta, S. Grozdanic & V. Stambuk eds. 1981) (discussions of Indian and
Yugoslavian examples); E. STEPHENS, THE POLITICS OF WORKERS' PARTICIPATION
(1980) (discussion of Peruvian example); D. ZWERDLING, DEMOCRACY AT WORK
(1978) (examples from the United States and Europe); see also INDUSTRIAL DEMoCRACY AND LABOUR MARKET POLICY IN SWEDEN (J. Fry ed. 1979); D. ToSCANO,
PROPERTY AND PARTICIPATION (1983) (discussion of Vermont Asbestos Group, Bates

Fabrics, and Colonial Cooperative Press, three employee-owned firms in the United
States).
The trend toward increased worker participation is not without its critics, however. On the broadest level, discussions of workplace democracy are often underlaid by
a strong ideological position that may obscure the strictly industrial-relations aspects of
such a system. See K. WALKER, WORKERS' PARTICIPATION IN MANAGEMENT: CONCEPTS AND REALITY (1970). But see J. VANEK, THE PARTICIPATORY ECONOMY 18-

19 (1971) (the transition to a participatory economy is easier "from the right" than
from the left partly because the motivational forces necessary for such an economy are
already recognized and fostered by the market capitalist right). From a more technical
point of view, it has been suggested that there are a number of constraints on the
development of true workplace democracy. See J. WrrTE, supra note 5, at 152-156
(suggesting constraints based on problems of communication, apathy, and other organizational factors). Suggestions have also been made that, in spite of the democratic values invoked, systems of worker participation may result, not in the creation of a participatory worker democracy, but in the creation of a "ruling worker elite." See S.
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creased democratization of the workplace will continue. As workers
gain more control of the workplace, however, their ability to unionize
under the Act becomes more vulnerable to attack under the COMS doctrine. Moreover, a small but growing number11 of firms are owned by
their workers in whole12 or in part.' 2' The decision in COMS presents
very difficult obstacles to the unionization of such employee-owners,
who may have acquired their positions through collective bargaining.' 2 2
The system of shared authority existing in mature institutions of
higher education advances both aspects of industrial democracy. Shared
authority is a system in which both faculty and administration exercise
effective influence on decisionmaking.1 23 It vests considerably more decisionmaking power in the faculty than is accorded employees in other,
more traditional management systems. Moreover, shared authority is a
system in which faculty and administrators can shape the terms and
DEWITT, WORKER PARTICIPATION AND THE CRISIS OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY

66 (1980); see also C.

cf.

155-

(1970);

PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY
H. WACHTEL, WORKERS' MANAGEMENT AND WORKERS' WAGES IN YUGOSLAVIA

186 (1973) (when market-related concerns such as efficiency conflict with social concerns, the former tend to prevail). Moreover, there is a strong intuitive appeal to the
idea that democratic institutions are less efficient than bureaucratic ones. For a discussion of this concern, see B. ABRAHAMSSON, BUREAUCRACY OR PARTICIPATION (1977).
19 See Note, Worker Ownership and Section 8(aX2) of the National Labor Relations Act, 91 YALE L.J. 615, 615 nn.3-4 (1982).
120 There has been a recent rise in the number of employee buyouts of their workplaces, particularly when those plants are faced with shutdown. See generally N.
STERN,

K.

WOOD

& T.

HAMMER, EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP IN PLANT SHUTDOWNS

(1979).
122 Workers may attain partial ownership in a variety of ways, including employee
stock ownership plans. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§
1001-1461 (1982) (found unconstitutional in part, Shelter Framing Corp. v.
Carpenters Pension Trust, 543 F. Supp. 1234 (1982)); see also I.R.C. § 4975 (1982).
122 Enterprises in which workers participate in management present troublesome
problems under this nation's labor laws as presently construed for a variety of reasons.
See, e.g., Sida, Inc., 191 N.L.R.B. 194 (1971) (excluding stockholder-employees from
unit of taxicab drivers); Brookings Plywood Corp., 98 N.L.R.B. 794 (1952) (holding
that 113 stockholder-employees were excluded from the Act's coverage), dismissed, 100
N.L.R.B. 431 (1952); see also Markham, Restrictions on Shared Decision-MakingAuthority in American Business, 11 CAL. W.L. REv. 217 (1975); Note, Collective Authority and Technical Expertise: Reexamining the ManagerialEmployee Exclusion, 56
N.Y.U. L. REv. 694 (1981); Note, Worker Ownership and Section 8(aX2) of the National Labor Relations Act, 91 YALE L.J. 615 (1982).
12 AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR HIGHER EDUCATION,
FACULTY PARTICIPATION IN ACADEMIC GOVERNANCE 17 (1967) [hereinafter cited as AAHE REPORT]; see

also American Association of University Professors, Statement on Government of Colleges and Universities, 52 A.A.U.P. BULL. 375, 376 (1966) ("The variety and complexity of the tasks performed by institutions of higher education produce an inescapable interdependence among governing board, administration, faculty, students and
others. The relationship calls for adequate communication among these components
and full opportunity for appropriate joint planning and effort."); supra note 111. Collective bargaining has been described as a variant of shared authority. See AAHE REPORT, supra, at 15.
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and conditions of employment in a way that is vastly different from,
and more nearly democratic than, the process that exists in most industries. Not surprisingly, attaining such a democratic workplace is a goal
of many collective bargaining agreements executed in the higher education context. By threatening the existence of such university power
structures, the COMS decision has undermined a model of industrial
democracy.
B.

The Present State of Faculty Collective Bargaining

The potential impact of COMS can be fully appreciated only when
set against the backdrop of the present state of faculty collective bargaining. Ideally, collective bargaining in any context should respond to
the concerns of the employees involved by accommodating the often
conflicting interests of management and labor. When compared to this
ideal, faculty collective bargaining fares well. It has responded to the
concerns of the employees in a way that, at least partially, accommodates faculty and administration interests. Furthermore, it has responded to faculty concerns regarding their role in the administration of
their workplace in a way that moves the university closer to a true
system of industrial democracy.
Faculties, like other groups of workers, organize for a variety of
reasons. Among these reasons are, of course, economic motives,12 4 but
faculties are also deeply concerned with increasing their voice in university governance ...and with insuring "due process" in personnel
decisions affecting them.12 Such concerns are often reflected in the provisions of collective agreements between faculties and administrations.12 An examination of faculty collective bargaining reveals that,
despite early apprehensions, it has operated to secure for faculty a voice
in areas that affect them and has responded to their particular needs.
During the early days of faculty unionization, fears of dire conse124 See R. CARR & D. VAN EYCK, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING COMES TO CAM52 (1973) (in a survey of 35 institutions that had entered into collective bargaining
in 1972, 23 had average compensation below the national average); Lindeman, The
Five Most Cited Reasons for Faculty Unionization, 102 INTELLECT 85, 85 (1973)
("The most common reason for faculty interest in collective bargaining cited in recent
literature is the dissatisfaction with compensation.").
125 See R.CARR & D.VAN EYCK, supra note 124, at 55-57; Lindeman, supra
note 124, at 185; Zeller, Why Faculties Organize, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN
HIGHER EDUCATION-THE DEVELOPING LAw 81, 82 (J. Vladek & S. Vladek eds.
1975) [hereinafter cited as J. VLADEK & S. VLADEK].
128 Zeller, supra note 125 at 82.
127 See R. JOHNSTONE, supra note 104, at 32-42, 119-26; Begin, Settle & BerkeWeiss, Patterns of Faculty Collective Bargaining in Community Colleges, 9 Rtrr.CAM. L.J. 699, 705 (1978).
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quences abounded. Many believed that collective bargaining would lead
to the destruction of the unique nature of university governancea'2 8-that is, that the nature of collective bargaining would necessarily lead to an adversarial relationship between faculty and administra29
tion inimical to the maintenance of a system of shared authority.1
Another important concern of the early critics of faculty bargaining was
the perceived negative effect that collective bargaining, and more particularly grievance arbitration, would have on tenure decisions and the
process of peer review.'3 0
These concerns were based on two preconceptions, neither of
which is necessarily true. The first is that collective bargaining creates
an essentially adversarial relationship in all contexts;' 3 ' the second, that
an adversary process would destroy university governance 3 2 (implying
that present relationships between faculty and administration are
nonadversarial).' 3
In practice, faculty collective bargaining has demonstrated that the
fears of its early critics were unwarranted. Faculties have progressed
128 Several unfair labor practice cases before the Board suggest that in at least
some instances the "unique" nature of university governance was rather illusory. See
Philander Smith College, 246 N.L.R.B. 499 (1979) (finding violation of § 8(a)(1) of
the Act where two faculty members were discharged after appearing before the Board
of Trustees and voicing grievances and complaints about the administration of the
school); Stephens Inst. v. NLRB, 620 F.2d 720 (9th Cir.) (administration fired union
instructors, two for having underenrolled classes and one for making critical remarks
about the school), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980).
121 See Finkin, Collective Bargainingand University Government, 1971 Wis. L.
REV. 125, 136-37; Kahn, supra note 57, at 81; McHugh, Effects of Bargaining on

Tenure and Other Academic Policies, in

FACULTY BARGAINING IN THE SEVENTIES

113, 120 (T. Tice ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as T. TICE]; Wollett, Self-Governance
and Collective Bargainingfor Higher Education Faculty: Can the Two Systems Coexist?, in J. VLADEK & S. VLADEK, supra note 125, at 33, 35.
120 See McHugh, supra note 129, at 124; Wollett, The Status and Trends of
Collective Negotiationsfor Faculty in Higher Education, 1971 Wis. L. REV. 2, 20-21.
Interestingly, concern has also been voiced over the exclusion of topics such as tenure
decisions from the governance-arbitration procedure. See Benewitz, Grievance and ArbitrationProcedures, in T. TICE, supira note 129, at 143, 154-56; Benewitz, Contract
Provisionsand Procedures,in J. VLADEK & S. VLADEK, supra note 125, at 275, 27679.
131 See Finkin, supra note 129, at 136-37; Wollett, supra note 129, at 35 ("Collective bargaining is an adversarial, not a collegial system."). But see R. CARR & D.
VAN EYCK, supra note 124, at 14-16 (collective bargaining is neither fully adversarial
nor fully cooperative).
132 The very fact that university faculties desire unionization belies this
second
assumption: a collegial decisionmaking system will not give rise to widespread faculty
concern over their university's governance. See supra notes 124-27 and accompanying
text; see also R. HARTNETT, COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY TRUSTEES: THEIR BACKGROUND, ROLES AND EDUCATIONAL ATTITUDES

33 (1969) (table 8) (of 5180 trustees

surveyed, 64% felt that tenure decisions should be made only by trustees or
administration).
133 See Zeller, supra note 125, at 82-85.
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toward resolution of some of their basic concerns through collective bargaining without causing the destruction of higher education. Collective
bargaining has enabled faculty units more effectively to influence those
aspects of their employment that troubled them and that gave rise to
their desire to unionize. For example, most collective agreements reflect
some progress toward assuring individual faculty members that they
will be accorded "due process" in personnel decisions"" through the
inclusion of grievance arbitration provisions.13 5 A number of studies indicate that such provisions have operated successfully. 3 Although they
have altered the processes employed, grievance arbitration provisions
have not occasioned the demise of academic peer review or collegiality.1 a 7 The available evidence suggests that standards for promotion and
tenure have not dropped precipitously. 8 What has evolved is a formalization not only of procedures, but also of standards.13 9
134 Concern for due process in personnel decisions is an important reason for
faculty unionization. See Zeller, supra note 125, at 82; see also Mintz, The CUNY
Experience, 1971 Wis. L. REv. 112, 121-22 (most grievances processed involved concerns of job security or application of academic judgment to tenure decisions).
"I R. JOHNSTONE, supra note 104, at 25-29 (only two of 89 agreements studied
did not have grievance-arbitration procedures; 18 had provisions that allowed grieving
of violations of faculty handbooks or other printed policies; 13 provided for a faculty
grievance committee; 84% had provisions for binding arbitration).
136 See, e.g., Betten & Oldson, Living Under the Contract I: The Techniques of
Collective BargainingContract Administration in Higher Education, in J. DOUGLAS,
supra note 79, at 43 (State University of Florida experience); D'Amico & Stupak,
Living Under the Contract II: The University of Maine Experience, in J. DOUGLAS,
supra note 79, at 51.
13I See M. Bersi, The Impact of Collective Bargaining on Selected Aspects of College Operations: A Comparison of the Perceptions of Management/Labor Participants
in a State College System 103 (1979) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Connecticut) (large majority of management and labor representatives surveyed at Connecticut State College system agreed that the contract grievance-arbitration procedures
protected faculty against arbitrary decision) [copy on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review].
"" See M. Bersi, supra note 137, at 124; J. Jimenez, Faculty Collective Bargaining in Higher Education: Antagonism or Cooperation in the Academic Enterprise 97
(1979) (unpublished Ed.D. dissertation, University of Oregon) [copy on file with the
University of Pennsylvania Law Review].
139 See Betten & Oldson, supra note 136, at 45; Morand, Collective Bargaining
and Collegiality: A PennsylvaniaView, 9 Rtr.-CAM. L.J. 715, 728 (1978); M. Bersi,
supra note 137, at 71.
Related to the assurance of due process in personnel decisions is the more general
concern over job security, see Zeller, supra note 125, at 83-84, which is also reflected in
many agreements. See R. JOHNSTONE, supra note 104, at 42-46 (47.2% of 89 agreements studied contained provisions dealing with dismissal of faculty; only three of these
did not mandate faculty input; 82% contained provisions dealing with retrenchment; in
43 agreements, faculty dismissal was handled through a seniority system.); see also
Veazie, University Collective Bargaining:The Experience of the Montana University
System, 9 J.C. & U.L. 51, 58 (1982) (contracts have had a beneficial effect on procedures of tenure and discharge); C. Gilmore, The Impact of Faculty Colldctive Bargaining on the Administration of Public Education in the United States with Particular
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On a larger scale, collective agreements have not crippled or de-

140
stroyed the mechanisms for faculty governance that antedated them.

Some agreements protect or formalize existing governance structures,141
142
and some reserve certain areas of decisionmaking to these structures.
Although generalizations may be difficult, collective bargaining seems
to strengthen faculty governance mechanisms where they were weak
originally. 143 In a more general sense, recent studies suggest that both
management and faculty representatives perceived collective bargaining
1
as generally increasing the strength of faculty in decisionmaking. 4
In short, faculty unionization, far from destroying shared authority, seems to be moving many institutions toward that form of management structure.1 45 Although faculty employment is perhaps the best example of shared authority, such a structure could be adopted in any
employment setting. Shared authority is, in many ways, equivalent to a
system of industrial democracy,1 46 the creation of which is one of the
primary purposes of the Act.1 4 ' The attainment of this goal is
Emphasis on the New England Region 251-52 (1979) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Massachusetts) (job security provisions have become increasingly significant) [copy on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review].
140 In some cases, faculty senates have disbanded after collective bargaining was
instituted. Of 14 campuses in the Pennsylvania state university system, two disbanded
faculty senates after the institution of collective bargaining. In one instance, the union
and the senate created an "interlocking directorate." In another, the union under the
agreement delegated authority to the senate. See Morand, supra note 139, at 726. Interestingly, one survey shows that a large majority of the faculty (79.2%) felt that collective bargaining had strengthened collegial governance, while only 44.4% of management representatives reached that conclusion. M. Bersi, supra note 137, at 75; see also
J. Jimenez, supra note 138, at 97.
141 See Lee, ContractuallyProtected Senates at Four-Year Colleges, in J. DOUGLAS,

supra note 79, at 56, 58.

See Veazie, supra note 139, at 60. This system bears a strong resemblance to
the system of codetermination found in West German labor relations. See generally
Summers, Codeterminationin the United States: A Projectionof Problems and Potentials, 4 J. COMP. CORP. L. & SEc. REG. 155 (1982) (discussing the elements of
codetermination as it might be constructed in the United States, in comparison with the
existing systems in other countries). Lee, supra note 141, at 57-58, reports the development of "dual-track" systems that delegate academic concerns to faculty senates and
economic concerns to unions. See also Baldridge & Kemerer, supra note 67, at 398 (fig.
1) (survey of the relative influence of union and senate power); M. Bersi, supra note
137, at 84 (85% of management and faculty representatives surveyed agreed that collective bargaining had not modified faculty senate jurisdiction at Connecticut state
colleges).
143 See Baldridge & Kemerer, supra note 67, at 396-97, 400; J. Jimenez, supra
note 138, at 97-98.
144 See M. Bersi, supra note 137, at 69; J. Jimenez,
supra note 138, at 98.
145 See J. Jimenez, supra note 138, at 99-100.
148 See supra text accompanying note 123.
147 See supra notes 108-12 and accompanying text.
142
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threatened by the COMS doctrine, 4" both directly and indirectly.
C.

COMS and IndustrialDemocracy

The most direct effect of COMS is that once employees have attained a degree of industrial democracy through collective bargaining,
the employer may refuse to negotiate a successor agreement or may
move to clarify the existing bargaining unit out of existence. Thus,
under COMS, a faculty that is considered to have achieved managerial
authority through collective bargaining loses the assurance of democratic process provided by the labor laws. With this loss may come a
repossession of faculty decisionmaking power, for once the faculty is
outside the Act's protection, any concessions of authority made to it by
the administration may be unilaterally revoked. Although the faculty
may then reunionize, 4 9 the sisyphean nature of this endeavor is all too
obvious.
The indirect result of COMS is potentially more unsettling than
the loss of the democratic bargaining process. Employees interested in
other than economic benefits of collective bargaining must face the
prospect that any successful campaign to secure some degree of control
over their workplace could lead to losing the protections of the Act.
This realization will chill unionization efforts where such efforts are
motivated primarily by noneconomic concerns. It may also have the unfortunate effect of encouraging employees to pursue primarily economic
gains and to eschew more meaningful decisionmaking concessions. The
lesson becomes clear: if industrial democracy is your goal in unionization, you cannot pursue it for fear of attaining it.
COMS conceives of the goals of collective bargaining as purely economic in spite of the tantalizingly broad language of the Act.""0 So to
restrict the range of possible outcomes of collective bargaining is to defeat attempts to achieve democracy in the workplace. The American
labor laws have been criticized for "articulat[ing] an ideology that aims
to legitimate and justify unnecessary and destructive hierarchy and
domination in the workplace." '5 1 After COMS, the fears of some of the
harshest critics of the development of American labor law appear all
See supra text accompanying notes 82-87.
See supra text following note 107.
150 The Act states that employees may choose representatives to bargain for them
with management over "rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions
of employment." 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982) (emphasis added).
151 Klare, Labor Law as Ideology: Toward a New Historiography of Collective
BargainingLaw, 4 INDUS. REL. L.J. 450, 452 (1981). See also Stone, supra note 4, at
1513-14.
148
"4
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too real.
Moreover, nothing about the COMS doctrine limits its application
to institutions of higher education. Indeed, the managerial exclusion itself was developed in an industrial context 5 2 and was transferred into
the context of university employment in Yeshiva. Just as Yeshiva has
been held applicable in noneducation managerial employee cases,15 3
COMS may be extended to other situations where employees attain authority solely through the operation of the collective bargaining process. 54 Although COMS rests upon Yeshiva for specific support, its real
basis is in the general managerial employee exception. Indeed, it includes within the managerial employee category any employee who
possesses "managerial" authority regardless of the source of that authority. "Nontraditional" management structures are, therefore, also
threatened by the COMS doctrine.1 "'
III.

RESOLUTION OF THE

COMS

DILEMMA

The problem with the COMS doctrine lies in the fact that it operates effectively to suppress industrial democracy as a goal of collective
bargaining and by extension as a goal of the Act. One simple way to
resolve this problem is to recognize COMS as an improper extension of
NLRB v. Yeshiva University'5 6 that should be overruled. Yeshiva, upon
which COMS rests, was not intended to reach beyond the limited realm
of "mature" universities. 5 ' As detailed above, mature institutions pre151See infra notes 164-65 and accompanying text.

253 See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
154 For example, should employees who are elected into positions of authority by
fellow employees pursuant to the provisions of the collective agreement be precluded
from being employees under the Act? See generally, Cooperativa de Credito y Ahorro
Vegabajena, 261 N.L.R.B. 1098 (1982) (election of two employees to "assembly of
delegates," which exercised power over the enterprise, did not render them managerial;
the Board characterized the exercise of power as "rare and insignificant").
155 See generally Note, supra note 67 (suggesting that the goals of nontraditional
management structures may be frustrated by application of managerial employee doctrine); Markham, supra note 122, at 235 (modification of Act may be required to
implement a real shared decisionmaking system); Note, supra note 119, at 626-27
(suggesting natural tension exists between the Act and unionization of worker-owned
firms).
156 444 U.S. 672 (1980).

157 "Maturity" as an analytic concept is less than precisely defined. The only real
touchstone available for giving it content is a factual comparison of the institution in
question with a model institution. This is the course followed by the Board and the
courts after Yeshiva. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text. The approach advocated in this Comment adds a new element to this examination: the nature of the
evolution of faculty-administration power relationships.
This solution to the problem presented by COMS will be limited, as will any
solution that accepts as a baseline the correctness of Yeshiva. That decision stands for
the limited proposition that faculty at "mature" universities are managerial for the
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sumably are characterized by stabilized power relationships developed
over a substantial period of time, and are therefore significantly different from those institutions in which authority is gained solely through
collective bargaining.1" 8
Power distributions created through collective bargaining, in contrast, are subject to significant and abrupt shifts at regular intervals as
contracts are renegotiated or interpreted by arbitrators. Although the
definition of maturity outside the university setting may prove difficult,
the recognition of the differences between institutions that are "mature"
in the Yeshiva sense and those that are not would prevent the spread of
COMS-like doctrine.1 59
On a more fundamental level, however, the difficulty with COMS
is that it, like Yeshiva, is rooted in the poorly conceived doctrine of
Cmanagerial employee." The exclusion of such employees does not rest
on the language of the Act. It rests instead partially on the 1947 exclusion of supervisors and partially on Board-created doctrine antedating
those amendments.1 6 0 Pre-1947 board decisions did not draw a fine line
between supervisors and managerial employees, but instead treated employees described as supervisors in the 1947 amendment (for example,
foremen) as excluded because they possessed managerial authority. 61
The Court has consistently interpreted the 1947 amendments as manifesting a broad desire on the part of Congress to exclude a large class of
employees: all those excluded by the Board as supervisory or managerial prior to Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB."6 2
The modern managerial employee exclusion serves to lock federal
labor policy and law into acceptance of a model of labor relations based
on conventional industrial hierarchies. As such, it is unresponsive to
changes in the nature of the American economy and is destructive of
the core policy values of the Act. Moreover, even the purpose behind
the 1947 amendments is not served by exclusion of those employees
who possess their authority only as a collective.1 6 The supervisory exception was passed to exclude from the Act's protection those individupurposes of the Act. Although one can argue that this result may be correct if true
collegiality of decisionmaking exists, the faculty's desire for union representation proves
that such collegiality did not exist at Yeshiva University. Moreover, even in a "mature"
institution, employees need the protection of the Act. See supra text accompanying
notes 69-73; infra note 167 and accompanying text.
158 See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
'1 See supra text accompanying notes 58-62.
180 See supra text following note 14.
161 See supra note 17; see also Lee, supra note 66, at 237.
162

330 U.S. 485 (1947).

See supra note 24-25 and accompanying text; see also Comment, Supervisory
Status, supra note 66, at 185-86 & n.136; Note, supra note 67, at 721-30.
163
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als who possessed certain types of authority within the shop,"" in order
to prevent such supervisors from dominating rank and file unions or,
conversely, from being dominated by rank and file unions. 6 5 This purpose presupposes an adversarial labor-management structure in which
the two groups have distinct roles and differing interests. The managerial exclusion is based on an extension of the same reasoning: managerial employees' functions align them so closely with their employer that
they cannot bargain with other employees. In a system of shared authority, however, the exercise of decisionmaking authority does not
make employees managerial instruments of the employer. In such a
system, employees have a voice in decisionmaking because the workplace has been democratized: they are a distinct group participating
with management in running a democratic workplace. The COMS decision misses this distinction.
Authority vested in a collective is not susceptible to the abuses
feared by those who drafted the 1947 amendments. An individual in
this type of system does not possess sufficient authority to dominate or
influence rank and file unions, nor does the individual acting alone possess sufficient authority "to hire, transfer, suspend, layoff, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees

. . .

or to

effectively recommend such action"' 66 without the approval and consent
of fellow workers. Moreover, because management does not consider
such an individual to be its agent, it does not expect, nor is it entitled
to, her undivided loyalty.
It is also erroneous to assume that once employees have attained a
voice in workplace decisions, they are on an equal-footing with management and therefore can dispense with the protection of the labor
laws. Although the interests of labor and management overlap more in
a system of shared authority than they otherwise do, they are never
identical. Even in a truly collegial setting, individual employees need
the representation of a union when they are forced into conflict with
the whole or are championing a minority position.' Especially where
the structure of shared decisionmaking has been achieved through collective bargaining, employees need the continued support of the Act to
preserve the democratic nature of their workplace.
164 The legislative history of the supervisory exception is heavily tied to examples
drawn from the context of heavy, mass production industries and is also heavily tied to
the exclusion of such employees as foremen. See H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st
Sess. 13 (1947).
165 See H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1947); S. REP. No. 105,
80TH CONG., 1ST SEss. 4 (1947).
166 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1982).
167 See J. Witte, supra note 5, at 152-53.
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When these considerations are brought to the university context, it
is obvious that the purposes of the 1947 amendments are not served by
excluding faculties. The 1947 amendments reflected two concerns of
Congress. 6 ' Congress wished to prevent the domination of rank and file
unions by supervisory employees, 6 9 and it wished to prevent the divi70
sion of supervisory employees' loyalty between employer and union.1
The exclusion of employees who, like faculty members, are in a real
sense rank and file serves neither of these purposes. Faculty, if able to
unionize, would not be able to dominate rank and file units. They are
the rank and file themselves. Moreover, if the exclusion of faculty
members at present is based on the amount of independence they have,
the "loyal agent" theory also loses much of its force. Faculty members
much more closely resemble regular employees than supervisors upon
whom management relies to direct the rank and file. Thus, a strong
argument can be made that the managerial exclusion should not be applied to faculty at all, whether or not their university is "mature."
Faculties that exercise decisionmaking authority are but one group
to whom the managerial exclusion should be inapplicable. No employee
who works in a system of shared authority should be denied the protection of the Act on the ground that she performs a managerial function.
If industrial democracy is a goal of the Act, it hardly furthers this purpose to remove from the purview of the labor laws the most democratic
working situations. When a structure of shared authority has been
achieved by means of the democratic process of collective bargaining,
depriving employees of the protection of the Act will seriously undermine the goal of industrial democracy. To accept this argument, one
need not assume that Congress, in passing the labor laws, intended to
bring about industrial democracy in the fullest sense: joint authority
exercised by labor and management. The more limited form of industrial democracy is also endangered by misapplication of the managerial
exclusion. Democracy in this sense encompasses the relationship between workers and their representatives and between those representatives and management, as well as the process by which labor and management come to an agreement on the terms and conditions of
employment. When the Act's protection is denied to workers who are
not agents of management, this democratic structure is weakened.
88

See supra text accompanying notes 23-28.

"I9H.R. Rep. No. 245,
170 Id. at 16.

80TH CONG., 1ST SESS.

14 (1947).
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CONCLUSION

In College of Osteopathic Medicine and Surgery, the Board fashioned a new and enormously powerful doctrine. This doctrine vitiates
much of the policy behind the National Labor Relations Act, and will
produce untoward results in a variety of labor-management settings.
The Board, in reaching its holding that managerial authority attained
solely through the operation of a collective bargaining agreement was
sufficient to warrant exclusion of the employees concerned as managers,
misapplied the perceived doctrinal basis of its decision and neglected to
consider its potential impacts. "Managerial" authority, if an appropriate ground for excluding employees at all, cannot be attained solely
through the exercise of the right to bargain collectively created by the
Act. The logic of the Board's decision threatens to transform the Act
into a device for the protection only of economic bargaining. Such a
transformation would be a betrayal not only of the plain meaning of
the Act, but also of the purpose and intent of the Act at its passage in
1935.

